This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a dominant …rm in an output quota market when the …rm is able to exercise market power in both the quota and the output markets. Even in the absence of enforcement, under certain conditions the …rm may comply or even over-comply with its quota. The only unambiguous requirement is that the …rm's initial quota endowment is strictly positive. Otherwise, the …rm will always cheat. These results appear robust to compliance or non-compliance in the competitive fringe.
Introduction
The basic e¢ ciency properties of a system of tradeable output quotas, such as ITQs (individual transferable quotas) in …sheries, are well documented. These largely mirror the basic properties of marketable emissions (pollution) permits, on which a considerable literature now exists. One essential di¤erence between output quotas and pollution permits, of course, is that the former de…ne rights directly over production of a marketable good or goods, which raises the possibility of …rms being able to exercise market power directly and simultaneously in both quota and output markets. This is an area, however, which has received relatively little attention. In particular, there is the interesting possibility that the ability to exercise market power in the output market may have an impact upon a …rm's compliance behaviour in the quota market.
In the pollution permit literature, Misiolek and Elder [14] examine the simultaneous exercise of market power in permit and output markets, but in their model permits and output are not directly related, although the same …rms participate in both markets and pollution permits are, de facto, necessary in order to produce for a local market. In this setting, Misiolek and Elder identify the possibility for what they term "exclusionary manipulation" of pollution permits, whereby …rms use permit market power in order to raise rivals' costs or to deter new entrants. The welfare implications of the concurrent exercise of market power in pollution permit and output markets have been examined by Malueg [13] , Innes, Kling and Rubin [10] and Sartzetakis [15, 16] . Like Misiolek and Elder, all these authors assume the equivalence of permit demands and emission levels, i.e., that there is perfect compliance and that …rms do not hold more permits than is required by the regulator. Compliance by a dominant …rm in a pollution permit market is considered by Malik [12] , extending the earlier work of Hahn [7] and van Egteren and Weber [5] on permit market power. As well as exploring the e¤ects of cheating, Malik identi…es the conditions under which a dominant …rm will hold excess permits.
Despite the often expressed concerns of policy makers and industry, few studies have examined the implications of either market power or non-compliance for ITQ markets, however. Anderson [1] models the pro…t-maximising behaviour of a (compliant) …shing …rm which has market power in both the quota market and the corresponding output market. He …nds that if the dominant …rm is initially allocated all the quota, in exercising monopoly power it will …nd it pro…table to hold quota in excess of its level of production, so increasing the output price. In the case where the dominant …rm initially owns none of the quota, he …nds no incentive for the …rm to acquire excess quota, a result which he generalises to any …rm with monopsony power in the quota market. In a recent paper, Anderson [2] revises this conclusion, but does not go on to examine further the conditions for the exercise of market power in both quota and output markets. Armstrong [3] looks at market power and e¢ ciency in a dynamic quota allocation model, along the lines of the pollution permit model in Hagem and Westskog [6] , but focuses only on market power in the quota market. To date, only two studies have analysed the impact of non-compliance upon ITQ markets. Chavez and Salgado [4] follow the pollution permit literature in assuming that …rms'expected penalties for non-compliance depend upon their quota violations measured in level terms (e.g., Malik [11, 12] ), deriving similar results (for example, non-compliance is found to always reduce quota demands). Hatcher [8] adopts a more general speci…cation of the violation argument in the expected penalty function and shows that the impact of non-compliance on …rms'quota demands is less straightforward, with the "level violation"model arguably being a special case.
The present paper examines both compliance and market power in an output quota market. The basic model follows closely the pollution permit model of Malik [12] , although the notation follows Hatcher [8] . After establishing some preliminary results for a competitive …rm, we examine …rstly the compliance behaviour of a …rm with market dominance in the quota market only and then consider a …rm with market power in both quota and output markets. Here, provided the dominant …rm's initial quota allocation is greater than zero, the …rm may choose to hold excess quota in relation to its output level, or it may cheat, depending upon the relative capacities of the dominant …rm and the competitive fringe and the slopes of the (inverse) demand curves for quota and output. If the initial quota allocation to the dominant …rm is zero, on the other hand, it will unambiguously cheat, although its quota demand may still be positive even in the absence of enforcement. After a brief consideration of the impact of non-compliance in the competitive fringe, a …nal section contains some concluding remarks.
An appendix presents a rigorous examination of the impact of non-compliance on a competitive …rm's quota demand when expected penalties are modelled as a function of relative, rather than level, violations. This expands on the analysis in Hatcher [8] and corrects an error in that earlier paper. 5 
Preliminaries
We consider an industry in which there are a large number of independently operated, pro…t-maximising …rms producing a single good. There is one dominant …rm, indexed i = 1, and a fringe of competitive …rms which we represent, without loss of generality, by a single price taking …rm, indexed i = 2. For the fringe …rm, we have the short run (social) bene…t function
where q 2 is output, p is the output price and c 2 (q 2 ) are variable costs. We assume c 00 2 (q 2 ) > 0, so that B 2 (q 2 ) is strictly concave in output. The necessary condition for (unconstrained) bene…t maximisation by the fringe …rm is then, as usual,
In a given period, a social planner or resource manager sets a total output quota for the industry. Quota is freely (costlessly) traded between …rms and each …rm demands an amount of quota Q i 0 at market equilibrium, where we assume the market clearing condition Q 1 + Q 2 = holds. A compliant competitive …rm, i.e., a …rm which always chooses Q 2 q 2 irrespective of any pecuniary incentive to do otherwise, then faces the short run pro…t maximisation problem
where r is the short run (rental) price of quota. 1 The corresponding Lagrangian
1 Note that the …rm's initial allocation of quota is assumed to be zero where the quota price is parametric to the …rm. In this case a non-zero initial quota allocation makes no di¤erence to the pro…t-maximising behaviour of the …rm.
gives the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum
For q 2 = Q 2 > 0, we have the necessary …rst-order conditions B 0 2 (q 2 ) = 2 and r = 2 and hence the usual decision rule for a compliant price taking …rm in a quota market,
Here, the quota demand Q 2 (r) of the …rm at a quota price r is given by the inverse of the marginal bene…t function B 0 2 (q 2 ) evaluated at r, i.e.,
with the slope of the quota demand curve given by the slope of B 0 1 2 (r):
; by the inverse function rule.
While the quota price is parametric to the competitive …rm, it is of course endogenous to the industry as a whole. The fringe demand for quota at a price r is Q 2 ( r). If Q 2 ( r) = Q 1 (the residual quota supply to the fringe) then r ( Q 1 ) is the marketclearing (equilibrium) quota price. Given the concavity of B 2 (q 2 ), the fringe inverse 
A dominant …rm in the quota market
Consider, …rst, a situation in which the dominant …rm can exert market power in the quota market but is a price taker in the output market (this might be the case, for example, if other, separately regulated, industries produced an identical good for the same market).
Here, the (compliant) dominant …rm's short run pro…t maximisation problem is
where Q 1 0 is the initial allocation of quota to the …rm. The corresponding Lagrangian
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimal solution are
For Q 1 = q 1 > 0; we then have, solving for 1 ,
where
and we can therefore state
Where the dominant …rm is behaving as a monopolist in the quota
Only in the case where Q 1 = Q 1 is the market equilibrium quota price the e¢ cient price, where the marginal costs of production are equated across all …rms. Otherwise, the quota price faced by the competitive fringe is either too low, so that the competitive …rms overproduce relative to the dominant …rm, or too high, so that the competitive …rms underproduce relative to the dominant …rm.
This is the basic (static) e¢ ciency result found by Hahn [7] for the analogous case of a market in pollution permits (see also van Egteren and Weber [5] and Malik [12] ).
If the dominant …rm …nds it pro…table to demand quota in excess of its requirement for legal production (Q 1 > q 1 > 0), then from the complementary slackness condition in (5c)
we must have 1 = 0 so that
which, given r ( ) > 0 and r 0 ( ) < 0, requires Q 1 < Q 1 . Thus we have
The dominant …rm will only demand excess quota if it is initially overendowed with quota to the extent that its marginal revenue from selling quota is zero when
This is (expressed in slightly di¤erent form) equivalent to the result found by Malik [12] for a dominant …rm in an emissions permit market. Note that, even if were to exceed the total unconstrained industry output, if the initial allocation of quota to the dominant …rm were large enough it could restrict the supply of quota to the competitive fringe and hence restrict the total level of output.
We could also have a Q 1 such that Q 1 = q 1 is an unconstrained solution to (4), but for any smaller Q 1 , the unconstrained …rm will be non-compliant. Although a non-compliant dominant …rm may have a positive quota demand, we cannot have Q 1 > Q 1 , i.e., the …rm will never be a net purchaser of quota. An unconstrained solution where
possible, but implies that r = 0, i.e., if (in the absence of enforcement) the non-compliant …rm demands only its initial quota allocation, then this must be such as to leave a residual quota supply to the fringe which equals or exceeds its total capacity. Note that, again in the absence of enforcement, Q 1 = 0 unambiguously implies Q 1 = 0.
Since, if we allow the …rm to be non-compliant, we can in general say that it will cheat wherever it has no incentive to hold excess quota, we have the obvious (and perhaps not entirely trivial) corollary, as noted by Malik [12] in the context of pollution permits, that it is possible for a dominant …rm to be "over-endowed" with quota such that it will not violate.
If we assume that the …rm is subject to enforcement of its quota compliance, however, we can replace the constraint term in the Lagrangian function with an expected penalty term is a function of the size of the …rm's quota violation, de…ned in general terms as v 1
we then have the …rst order conditions
and
Subtracting (10) from (9) and rearranging, we obtain the joint decision rule
Notice that if the expected penalty is assumed to depend only upon the level violation
, as is generally assumed in the pollution permit literature for example,
and hence we have
as before, so that B 0 1 (q 1 ) = r when Q 1 = Q 1 , as in the case of a compliant …rm. If, on the other hand, the expected penalty depends upon the relative size of the violation, i.e., 2 then in the …rst order conditions we will have
so that (10) becomes
2 see Hatcher [8, 9] Now, q 1 > Q 1 implies that
With a relative violation argument in the expected penalty function, we therefore have
which leads us to 
A dominant …rm in both quota and output markets
Now consider a …rm with market dominance in both the quota and output markets (this might arise in a situation where the entire output market is supplied by one industry under quota regulation). The (compliant) dominant …rm's short run pro…t maximisation problem can now be written as
where1 + q 2 is the combined output of the dominant …rm and the competitive fringe and p (q) is the inverse consumer demand for that output, with, we assume, p 0 (q) < 0.
Note that changes in p (q) impact upon both B 1 ( ) as well as, indirectly through the e¤ect on B 0 2 ( ), the equilibrium quota price r ( ).
The corresponding Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
For Q 1 = q 1 > 0, we then have
13 and r ( ) + @r ( )
where we have used @B 1 ( ) =@p ( ) = q 1 and @r ( ) =@p (q) = 1.
3 Note that here @B 1 ( ) =@q 1
and @r ( ) =@Q 1 are equivalent to B 0 1 (q 1 ) and r 0 ( ) in the previous section.
Solving (18) and (19) for 1 , we obtain the joint optimal decision rule
where, as before,
The additional term on the LHS of (20) captures the …rm's net marginal impact upon its revenues from output as well as revenues from, or costs of, quota trade, through the e¤ect of its own output and quota demand upon the total industry output q and hence the market price p (q).
In order to examine the dominant …rm's impact upon q, note …rstly that
where @q 2 =@q 1 is the …rm's conjectural derivative for the output of the competitive fringe in relation to its own output. If the output of the fringe is constrained by its residual quota supply, i.e., q 2 = Q 2 = Q 1 , then we can assume @q 2 =@q 1 = 0 (Cournot) and therefore @q=@q 1 = 1. Similarly,
Here, given market clearing in the quota market, a compliant fringe implies @q 2 =@Q 1 = @Q 2 =@Q 1 = 1, so that @q=@Q 1 = 1.
3 Assuming that the fringe is compliant, we have r ( ) = B If @q=@q 1 = 1 and @q=@Q 1 = 1, then @q=@q 1 + @q=@Q 1 = 0 and (20) collapses to
as in the case of a …rm with dominance only in the quota market. Although, given a compliant fringe, Q 1 = q 1 implies that the dominant …rm has no net e¤ect upon total industry output (which remains equal to ), note that only where
are the …rst order conditions equivalent to those for a …rm with dominance only in the quota market (unless Q 1 = 0, however, this would imply q 1 > Q 1 , i.e., cheating). Note, also, that here we could not have
For an unconstrained solution to the dominant …rm's problem (q 1 R Q 1 ), we require 1 = 0 in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and hence, from (18) and (19), and given @q=@q 1 = 1 and
where we have rearranged terms in order more clearly to distinguish the marginal impacts on revenues from output and on revenues from (costs of) quota selling (buying). From (21) we can see that the optimal net marginal bene…t of output could now be negative if it is pro…table to purchase quota in order to support the output price. In the case where Q 1 = Q 1 , notice, the dominant …rm produces where
which is equivalent to the usual rule for a monopoly producer. At the same time, we would 15 have r ( ) = p 0 (q) q 1 and hence @B 1 ( ) =@q 1 = r ( ), so that total output, although it may not equal , is e¢ ciently produced (given, as before, certain assumptions about the fringe). Here, the dominant …rm's initial allocation is such that it does not exercise market power in the quota market, although it does in the output market. In this case, Hahn's [7] result still holds, even where Q 1 < q 1 .
From (21) and (22), we can observe that, for an unconstrained solution to the …rm's problem, we have the condition
where we know that This holds even if the …rm becomes a net purchaser of quota as a result.
Proof. Given p 0 (q) < 0, in (23) we require Q 1 Q 1 q 1 < 0 and hence Q 1 Q 1 < q 1 . This immediately excludes the possibility that a dominant …rm will be compliant when its initial allocation Q 1 is zero, but otherwise Q 1 q 1 does not now require Q 1 > Q 1 , as is the case when the dominant …rm has market power only in the quota market.
Note that the condition Q 1 > 0 ensures that, if the dominant …rm is a net purchaser of quota, the amount of quota purchased is strictly less than output. Rearranging the RHS of (23), we can also observe that if the …rm is holding excess quota we will always have
i.e., the amount of excess quota held (if any) is strictly less than the …rm's initial allocation.
Proposition 1 contradicts the …nding of Anderson [1] that, if the dominant …rm were a net purchaser of quota, it would never be pro…table for it to restrict its output "because any increase in the price of the marketable output will be transferred into an increase in the purchase price (of quota)" (p.296). Anderson's conclusion derives from his assumption that, in the monopsony case, the …rm's initial quota allocation was zero so that, as we have seen, the …rm will indeed not hold excess quota. More recently, Anderson [2] revises this earlier conclusion, although without further formal analysis of the problem. 4 As we have seen, the dominant …rm will not freely even match its quota demand to its output if the initial quota allocation is zero, which we can state as Corollary 1. If the dominant …rm's initial quota allocation is zero, it will unambiguously cheat.
Proof. If Q 1 = 0 in (23), we must have Q 1 < q 1 .
While Q 1 < q 1 is the only possible unconstrained solution to (16) if Q 1 = 0, however, it is also an unconstrained solution if Q 1 > 0. If, in (21) and (22), Q 1 = 0, then we will have
and r ( ) + @r ( )
Here, notice, we cannot rule out Q 1 > 0 even where r ( ) > 0, i.e., the …rm may now purchase quota even if it is not subject to any enforcement.
In summary, if the initial endowment of quota to the dominant …rm is greater than zero, the …rm may choose to withhold quota from the market or to cheat, or indeed to match quota and output. The outcome will be parameter-speci…c, depending upon the relative production capacities of the dominant …rm and the competitive fringe as well as the relative slopes of the consumer inverse demand curve for the industry output and the (fringe) inverse quota demand curve. If, however, the dominant …rm's initial quota allocation is zero, it will unambiguously be non-compliant, although even in the absence of enforcement the …rm's quota demand may still be positive. Here, Q 1 < q 1 implies that total output exceeds and hence the output price is lower than if the …rm is compliant.
If the …rm is non-compliant, on the other hand, we can assume as before that it is subject to enforcement and expects to incur a penalty for a violation. Then, still letting @q=@q 1 = 1 and @q=@Q 1 = 1, for Q 1 < q 1 we have the …rst order conditions
and hence
as we had previously. Again, Hahn's [7] result can hold for a non-compliant …rm (depending upon our assumptions about the behaviour of the fringe) if and only if the violation in the expected penalty function is expressed in level terms, i.e., v 1 q 1 Q 1 .
A non-compliant fringe
We have so far assumed that the competitive fringe is compliant. We now brie ‡y consider how our analysis of the dominant …rm's behaviour changes if we relax this assumption.
Non-compliance in the fringe has two e¤ects in our model. Firstly, as noted by Malik [12] in the context of pollution permits, non-compliance a¤ects the elasticity of the fringe's Secondly, in our analysis of a dominant …rm with both quota and output market power, recall that the assumption of a compliant fringe enabled us to assume that @r ( ) =@p (q) = 1 and that @q=@q 1 = @q=@Q 1 = 1, so that in the decision rule
the …rst bracketed term on the LHS was equal to zero and the expression collapsed to
as for a …rm with quota market power alone.
If expected penalties in a non-compliant fringe are assumed to depend upon the level violation size, we will still have B fore we cannot assume that @r ( ) =@p (q) = 1. Nevertheless, we would still expect that @r ( ) =@p (q) > 0 and hence the sign of @q=@Q 1 to be unchanged. Looking now at the (unconstrained) condition for Q 1 written out in full
we can see, provided we still have @q=@Q 1 = @q 2 =@Q 1 < 0, that R 1 (Q 1 ) takes the opposite sign to Q 1 Q 1 q 1 . However, it is then apparent that we must have R 1 (Q 1 ) > 0 and hence Q 1 Q 1 q 1 < 0 as before (since we cannot have R 1 (Q 1 ) < 0 and
. If @q 2 =@Q 1 = 0, however, then R 1 (Q 1 ) = 0, which again requires
on the other hand, implies that the dominant …rm expects the fringe to increase its output in response to a decrease in its residual quota supply, which we can dismiss as perverse.
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In the corresponding condition for q 1
we can therefore assume that Q 1 Q 1 q 1 < 0. Here, fringe non-compliance does not change the resultant positive sign of the expression provided @q 2 =@q 1 > 1. If @q 2 =@q 1 = 1 (the usual competitive conjecture) then @q=@q 1 = 0 and hence @B 1 ( ) =@q 1 = 0, as for a dominant …rm with no market power in the output market. If @q 2 =@q 1 < 1, on the other hand, we will have @q=@q 1 < 0 and hence @B 1 ( ) =@q 1 < 0.
In summary, in the case of a dominant …rm with both quota and output market power, fringe non-compliance does not change the sign of Q 1 Q 1 q 1 in the conditions for unconstrained pro…t maximisation and therefore does not substantially change our conclusions about the dominant …rm's behaviour, although at the margins it will a¤ect the …rm's choices of q 1 and Q 1 (and we can no longer assume @B 1 ( ) =@q 1 = R 1 (Q 1 ) as before).
Conclusion
We have shown that an unconstrained …rm with dominance in both quota and output markets may hold excess quota in order to support the output price, even if it is a net buyer of quota, provided that its initial quota allocation is non-zero. Even in the absence of enforcement, therefore, the dominant …rm may …nd it pro…table to comply or to overcomply with its quota rather than to cheat. The outcome is parameter-speci…c, but the amount of any excess quota held will be strictly less than the …rm's initial quota allocation
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(this could provide a general "rule of thumb"for the avoidance of output restriction under quotas). If the …rm's initial quota allocation is zero, on the other hand, it will always cheat, although, even in the absence of enforcement, a non-compliant …rm may still purchase some quota.
Hahn's [7] e¢ ciency result holds in all cases for both compliant and non-compliant …rms except where expected penalties are not modelled as a function of level violations...
Appendix A
For a non-compliant price-taking …rm, the short run (risk-neutral) expected pro…t maximisation problem is
where the expected …ne 2 (v 2 ) is de…ned as before. From the Lagrangian, the KuhnTucker conditions for an optimum are
If the violation is expressed in level terms, i.e., v 2
as for a compliant …rm (Malik [11] ).
Consider, however, the case where the expected penalty is a function of the …rm's relative violation of its quota demand. Thus let v 2 q 2 =Q 2 , with
we then have the …rst-order necessary conditions
If we solve (A-3) and (A-4) for 0 2 (v 2 ), we can …nd the "violation ratio"identity
which, following Hatcher [8] , we will henceforth denote by 2 (r). Here, a value of 2 (r) = 1 obviously indicates compliance. Given Q 2 (r) = 2 (r) q 2 (r), we can then …nd the slope of the quota demand curve as
Similarly, from B 0 2 (q 2 ) = 2 (r) r, we can …nd
where, by the inverse function rule, B we obtain
For a compliant fringe …rm, notice, 2 (r) = 1 and d 2 (r) =dr = 0 everywhere, so that (A-8) collapses to
as we would expect.
In order to interpret expression (A-8), we need to be able to sign d 2 (r) =dr for a noncompliant …rm. Although, by de…nition, non-compliance implies that we must have d 2 (r) =dr < 0 around r = 0 (where we assume there is no incentive to cheat and therefore 2 (r) = 1), we cannot, a priori, be sure about the sign of the derivative as the quota price increases further. To examine d 2 (r) =dr we must turn to the comparative statics of the problem.
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If we totally di¤erentiate the …rst order conditions (A-2a) and (A-2b) with respect to q 2 , Q 2 and r, we obtain
which we can rearrange and write in matrix form as
Using Cramer's Rule, we can then …nd
Given 2 (r) Q 2 (r) =q 2 (r), it is then straightforward to …nd
where, using (A-11) and (A-12), we can evaluate the expression in brackets as
The sign of (A-15) therefore depends upon the sign of (A-16), in which the …rst term in the bracketed expression is negative while the second term is positive. If, as stated previously, around r = 0 we have d 2 (r) =dr < 0, this implies that here
Given dQ 2 (r) =dr < 0, however, at some higher quota price the quota demand must be reduced to the point where we have
We can then infer that there is some intermediate quota pricer at which d 2 (r) =dr = 0, which implies a minimum value of 2 (r) and hence a maximum relative violation. We can, therefore, state Result A1. When expected penalties are a function of relative quota violations, the violation rate is initially increasing in the quota price, but reaches a maximum and then declines as the quota price increases further.
We can now evaluate the slope expression (A-8), …rstly at r = 0. Here we assume that 2 (r) = 1 and d 2 (r) =dr < 0, so that
At r = 0, therefore, the non-compliant quota demand curve is more elastic than the compliant quota demand curve. At some arbitrarily high quota price, Q 2 ! 0 and hence 
Here, where the relative violation is at a maximum, the non-compliant quota demand curve is unambiguously less elastic than that of an otherwise identical compliant …rm.
Thus we have
Result A2. When expected penalties are a function of relative quota violations, the noncompliant quota demand is more elastic than the compliant quota demand at very low or very high quota prices, but is less elastic at intermediate quota prices.
This contrasts with the …nding in Hatcher [8] , where it was implicitly assumed, erroneously, that d 2 (r) =dr = 0 everywhere and hence non-compliant quota demands were always less elastic.
Result A2 implies that the non-compliant quota demand curve intersects the compliant quota demand curve, as suggested by Hatcher [8] . By Cramer's Rule we can then …nd
where, from (A-15),
Given @ 0 2 ( ) =@ > 0, we can see that dQ 2 ( ) =d always takes the opposite sign to d 2 ( ) =dr. Where the violation rate is increasing in the quota price, therefore, increasing enforcement increases quota demand, but where the violation rate is decreasing in the quota price, increasing enforcement reduces quota demand. Where the violation rate is unchanging in the quota price, increasing enforcement has no e¤ect upon quota demand, which implies that here the non-compliant quota demand must equal the compliant quota demand. This represents a proof of the result found by Hatcher [8] , which we can restate as Result A3. (Hatcher) With expected penalties for quota non-compliance dependent upon relative violations, the quota demand of a non-compliant …rm exactly coincides with that of an otherwise identical compliant …rm at the quota price at which the non-compliant …rm's relative violation rate is at a maximum. At lower quota prices, the non-compliant quota demand is lower, but at higher quota prices the non-compliant quota demand is higher than that of an otherwise identical compliant …rm.
